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De-concentrating Poverty: De-constructing a Theory and the Failure of Hope 
Michael Diamond* 
Introduction 
Our nation is moving toward two societies, 
one black, one white – separate and unequal1 
 
Racial segregation has been a problem in the United States for generations. Despite 
the passage of the Fair Housing Act in 1968,2 many of the nation’s communities remain 
highly segregated by race. The economic segregation of the poor has also been a major 
problem although until about 25 years ago it had commanded far less attention. Given the 
high correlation between poverty and race, the combination of racial discrimination and 
the limited availability of affordable housing has had the effect of thrusting the poor into 
(or creating) neighborhoods with concentrated pockets of extreme poverty. Many 
commentators have claimed that this concentration of poverty has produced enormously 
negative societal consequences. 
 
In 1987 William Julius Wilson, then a University of Chicago sociologist, published 
his influential book, The Truly Disadvantaged.3 While Wilson was not the first to point 
out the negative effects of concentrated poverty, the book fomented a revolution in 
housing policy. Wilson argued that the concentration of poverty, the very high percentage 
of people with incomes below the poverty line living within a defined geographic 
community, resulted in severely negative societal externalities far in excess of what 
would be expected for isolated circumstances of individual poverty.4 
 
Wilson’s observations led to a series of federal and local policy prescriptions, each 
having the ostensible goal of de-concentrating poverty in high-concentration 
neighborhoods. Among the resulting legislative initiatives was the HOPE VI program for 
the redevelopment of public housing.5 Congress also adopted a demonstration program, 
Moving to Opportunity (MTO),6 in which low-income residents were given special §8 
vouchers in order to move to other, often suburban, low-poverty neighborhoods. There 
were also several local programs designed to accomplish the same result.7 
 
                                                 
* I would like to thank my friends and colleagues, Peter Byrne, Mike Seidman and Gerry Spann for their 
extremely useful comments on various drafts of this chapter. I also want to acknowledge the exemplary 
research assistance of Jared Lamb.  This article first appeared in COMMUNITY, HOME AND IDENTITY, 
Michael Diamond & Terry Turnipseed, eds.  (Ashgate 2112). 
1 US Nat'l Advisory Comm'n on Civil Disorders, Report Of The National Advisory Commission On Civil Disorders 
(1968) [hereinafter Kerner Commission Report]. 
2 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619 (2006).  
3 William Julius Wilson, The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, The Underclass, and Public Policy (1987). 
4 This argument, while accepted by many social scientists and policy-makers, has been strongly contested, a point to 
which I will return later in this chapter. 
5 Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998, Pub L. No. 105–276, 112 Stat. 2461, 2473–74 (1998) 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1437v (2006)). 
6 Moving to Opportunity for Fair Housing, Pub. L. No. 103-120, § 3, 107 Stat. 1148 (1993) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 
1437f (2006)). 
7 One of the oldest and most widely utilized is Inclusionary Zoning. Inclusionary Zoning (which may be mandatory 
or voluntary, depending on the jurisdiction) requires developers to include a certain percentage of affordable units in 
their residential developments of more than a certain number of units. In exchange, the developer receives some form 
of regulatory relief, often a density bonus above what the zoning regulations would ordinarily allow or fast-track 
processing of permits. The percentage of affordable units and the targeted income of lower income residents varies by 
jurisdiction. See, e.g., MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., CODE § 25A–1 (2006). 
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Even before The Truly Disadvantaged was published, there had been efforts to 
break up the racially concentrating effects of federal public housing policy. For example, 
Hills v Gautreaux8 challenged the racially segregated siting of public housing by the 
Chicago Housing Authority (CHA). The litigation resulted in a consent decree that 
ultimately allowed more than 7,000 households to move to less segregated housing in the 
Chicago metropolitan area.9 Due, again, to the high correlation between class and race, 
particularly in public housing, the extreme racial segregation that was the focal point of 
the Gautreaux suit also resulted in a very high concentration of poverty in those Chicago 
neighborhoods.10 
There is, however, a certain irony to the development of and ardor for these 
governmental programs, since a major contributing cause of racial and (to a great extent) 
economic segregation in many residential communities had been the housing and housing 
finance policy of federal and local governments. For example, beginning in the 1930s and 
continuing, certainly at least, through the 1960s and early 1970s, the Federal Housing 
Administration (FHA), The United Stated Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD), and their predecessors and affiliates had an explicit policy of 
segregating the races and, as time went on, of displacing residents in predominantly black 
communities in the name of redeveloping “blighted” urban neighborhoods.11 
For a particularly stark example of the interplay between racial segregation and 
concentrations of poverty, one, again, need look no further than the policies concerning 
the siting of public housing developments that were challenged in Gautreaux. For 
decades, public housing developments, which came to house some of the nation’s poorest 
families, were placed in predominantly minority neighborhoods.12 These developments, 
large, highly segregated, and housing an extremely poor population, contributed mightily 
to the considerable concentration of poverty in those communities (in fact, often causing 
the high concentration of poverty) while also reinforcing the preexisting pattern of 
segregation.13 
The Gautreaux litigation, begun in 1966, was initiated by residents in segregated 
public housing operated by the CHA.14 The litigation resulted in a consent judgment that 
called for the dispersal of CHA residents to less racially segregated communities, which, 
incidentally, were also often less poor. Under the consent decree program, CHA residents 
were given vouchers that allowed them to move to other housing accommodations and 
about 7,000 households took advantage of the program. 
After Gautreaux, several programs, both federal and local, were initiated to the 
point that today, the effort to de-concentrate poverty has become an accepted, if not the 
                                                 
8 425 US 284 (1976).  
9 Molly Thompson, Relocating from the Distress of Chicago Public Housing to the Difficulties of the Private Market: 
How the Move Threatens to Push Families Away from Opportunity, 1 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL'Y 267, 270 ("The 
Gautreaux Program ended in 1998 after relocating approximately 7100 families." (citing LEONARD S. RUBINOWITZ & 
JAMES E. ROSENBAUM, CROSSING THE CLASS AND COLOR LINES: FROM PUBLIC HOUSING TO WHITE SUBURBIA 39 
(2000))). 
10 Of course, the fact that the original neighborhoods contained large public housing projects almost guaranteed the 
high poverty concentrations that accompanied the racially discriminatory siting policies of the CHA. 
11 See, e.g., Kenneth T. Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States, 195–218 (1985). 
12 See Gautreaux, 425 US at 286–87. 
13 The governmental policies were not, of course, the sole cause of the segregated communities. In fact government 
policy typically reflected public attitudes at the time. These attitudes were also often shared by the government 
policymakers. 
14 While conditions in the various public housing developments were often deplorable and while the social 
environment was dangerous and unsatisfactory, the case was about the discriminatory siting and resident placement 
in these developments. 
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preeminent, anti-poverty choice in federal and many local policy circles.15 The de-
concentration policy, however, has met with substantial criticism from a range of 
commentators including academics, community activists and policy-makers as well as 
from many residents who are (or who are threatened to be) subjected to the de-
concentration policy. The criticism has been about both the practical implementation and 
performance of the programs and about more conceptual issues concerning their very 
nature. 
On the practical level, studies have shown repeatedly that many of the hoped-for 
fundamental benefits of de-concentration have not been achieved. For example, low-
income residents have failed, for the most part, to build social capital when they have 
moved into higher-income neighborhoods or when they returned to redeveloped HOPE 
VI neighborhoods.16 Moreover, there has not been appreciable gain for the economically 
integrated low-income residents in their employment or income status.17 Instead, there is 
substantial evidence that such residents have suffered significant economic or other 
hardship due to higher housing costs,18 higher costs of daily living,19 and problems with 
transportation.20 
On the conceptual level, critics have focused on the destruction of preexisting 
communities21 and the elimination for many people of the social safety net that their old 
communities provided for them.22 Some take the critique even further and suggest that, as 
was claimed to be the case with Urban Renewal and the Interstate Highway program, the 
current de-concentration programs are deliberately designed to and, in most cases do, 
displace African-American families and communities.23 
                                                 
15 Even the Low Income Housing Tax Credit program, the other major governmental affordable housing initiative, 
permits some mixing of income levels. 
16 Melody L. Boyd et al., The Durability of Gains from the Gautreaux Two Residential Mobility Program: A 
Qualitative Analysis of Who Stays and Who Moves from Low-Income Poverty Neighborhoods, 20 HOUS. POL'Y 
DEBATE 119, 125 (2010).  
17 Edward G. Goetz, Better Neighborhoods, Better Outcomes? Explaining Relocation Outcomes in HOPE VI. 12 
CITYSCAPE 2, 9 (2010). 
18 LARRY BURON ET AL, THE HOPE VI RESIDENT TRACKING STUDY 99 (2002), available at 
http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/410591_HOPEVI_ResTrack.pdf: Susan J. Popkin, The HOPE VI Program: What 
has Happened to the Residents, in WHERE ARE THE POOR TO LIVE: TRANSFORMING PUBLIC HOUSING COMMUNITIES 83 
(Larry Bennett et al., eds, 2006). 
19 Boyd et al., supra note 16, at 125; SUSAN J. POPKIN ET AL., A DECADE OF HOPE VI: RESEARCH FINDINGS AND 
POLICY CHALLENGES 45 (2004), http:// www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/411002_HOPEVI.pdf.  
20 James Rosenbaum et al., New Capabilities in New Places: Low-Income Black Families in Suburbia, in THE 
GEOGRAPHY OF OPPORTUNITY: RACE AND HOUSING CHOICE IN METROPOLITAN AMERICA 168 (Xavier de Souza Briggs 
ed., 2005). 
21 Stephen Steinberg, The Myth of Concentrated Poverty, in THE INTEGRATION DEBATE: COMPETING FUTURES FOR 
AMERICAN CITIES 213, (Chester Hartman & Gregory Squires eds, 2010) 
21 Stephen Steinberg, The Myth of Concentrated Poverty, in THE INTEGRATION DEBATE: COMPETING FUTURES FOR 
AMERICAN CITIES 213, (Chester Hartman & Gregory Squires eds, 2010) 
22 This includes financial support from friends and relatives as well as other support such as child care and 
transportation assistance. 
23See, e.g., Steinberg, supra note 21. (“It is debatable whether integration efforts bestow on poor African-Americans 
economic or sociological benefits or, rather, destroy non-white political power, sense of community, culture, and 
neighborhood-based support systems.”) (quoting William P. Wilen & Wendy L. Stasell, Gautreaux and Chicago’s 
Public Housing Crisis: The Conflict between Achieving Integration and Providing Decent Housing for Very Low-
Income African Americans, in WHERE ARE POOR PEOPLE TO LIVE? TRANSFORMING PUBLIC HOUSING COMMUNITIES 
supra note 18, at 239, 249); David Imbroscio, “[U]nited and Actuated by Some Common Impulse of Passion": 
Challenging the Dispersal Consensus in American Housing Policy Research, 30 J. URB. AFF. 111 (2008). 
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In this chapter I add my own critique to the literature on the de-concentration of 
poverty.24 Part of my concern is about implementation. For example, even if all of the 
supposed benefits were available to relocating residents (which they are not), the 
aggregate number of households being relocated by these programs represents only a tiny 
portion of the households living in highly concentrated neighborhoods.25 Moreover, the 
destroyed affordable housing in poor communities is not being replaced on a one-for-one 
basis. The result is an increasing gap between the demand for decent affordable housing 
and the supply.26 This is particularly troubling for the lowest income residents who 
comprise a significant percentage of those who live in public housing. Because the 
private market cannot economically house them and there are no other governmental 
programs designed to do so, the units lost due to de-concentration will never be 
replaced.27 The result is increased homelessness, more people “doubling up” in units, and 
more people paying a very high percentage of their household income for rent, thereby 
leaving other household needs unmet. 
My main critical focus, however, will be on the conceptual problems of de-
concentration. In particular, I am apprehensive about the social, cultural, and political 
ramifications of destroying existing communities. Despite popular conceptions, poor 
communities, just as other communities, contain networks and institutions that are 
valuable to the residents of those communities and to society. For just this reason, many 
people faced with involuntary dislocation under one of the de-concentration programs 
resist the move. Moreover, those who are forced to move often move back to their 
original or to a similar neighborhood at their first opportunity.28 The consequence is that 
the forcible de-concentration of poverty in one neighborhood often creates new or 
worsening concentrations in other neighborhoods. This presumably unintended 
consequence, a result of the lack of affordable housing throughout the economy, suggests 
the weakness, if not the failure, of the de-concentration policy. 
It does not follow that we, as a society, should encourage concentrated poverty. 
Economic integration has many advantages. In fact, to the extent that de-concentration 
programs are voluntary, that is, to the extent that residents of concentrated low-income 
communities want to move to mixed-income, mixed-race communities, they should be 
encouraged. On the demand side, support, both financial and technical, should be made 
available by government to residents of high-concentration neighborhoods. On the supply 
side, greater support should be provided for the development and preservation of 
                                                 
24 While the critique will focus primarily on the HOPE VI program, which is by far the largest of the federal de-
concentration programs, the concerns that I and others have expressed are applicable, to a great extent, to the other 
federal and many local programs. Where critiques do not have general applicability, I will discuss the distinctions to 
be made. 
25 As of 2008, 72,265 households had been relocated from HOPE VI developments, which represented 98% of the 
planned relocation. There were 91,802 units demolished, 95% of the planned demolition: 72,196 units were 
constructed or rehabilitated, 65% of the planned total of 111,059. Of these planned new or rehabilitated units, about 
55% will go to public housing residents although only about 24 % of the original households had returned to the 
completed HOPE VI development of the planned 38% of households to return. G. Thomas Kingsley, Appendix A: 
Scope and Status of the Hope VI Program, in FROM DESPAIR TO HOPE: HOPE VI AND THE NEW PROMISE OF PUBLIC 
HOUSING IN AMERICAN CITIES 300 (Henry C. Cisneros & Lora Engdahl eds, 2009). Kingsley discounts the net loss of 
units by pointing out that many of the destroyed units were unoccupied and many of these were “vacant and 
uninhabitable” (although he concedes that the number of habitable but unoccupied units is not reliably known). Id. 
26 J. Peter Byrne & Michael Diamond, Affordable Housing, Land Tenure, and Urban Policy: The Matrix Revealed, 
34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 527 (2007). 
27 It is not an adequate response to say that a large number of the demolished units were uninhabited or even that they 
were uninhabitable. The fact is that those units were in existence to serve the extremely low-income population but 
they have permanently been taken out of the inventory. 
28 Boyd et al., supra note 16, at 122.  
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affordable units throughout the economy and fair housing laws should be strictly 
enforced to allow unfettered mobility. 
The compulsory destruction of communities and involuntary displacement of 
residents, however, is another matter. Such actions are, to my mind, immoral, impractical 
and incoherent. They should be replaced with policies that provide for strengthening 
existing communities and for increasing the availability of affordable housing in higher 
income communities. The latter should be accompanied by mobility counseling and 
rental or purchase subsidies so that low-income households generally would be able to 
choose whether to move from their original communities to higher income 
neighborhoods and have the ability to do so if that is their choice 
The alternative that I will develop later in this chapter is that we must strengthen 
existing low-income communities through appropriate interactive institutions (schools, 
health care, day care, job training, economic development, and so on). We should 
concentrate on making existing low-income communities into places where residents are 
proud to reside. These would be places where residents might retain the social ties and 
the supports available in their communities while at the same time offering them some of 
the benefits theorized by the advocates of mixed-income communities. 
Low-income communities are fundamentally similar to other, higher-income, 
communities: there are people with talent and ambition; there are social connections that 
are valuable to existing residents; and institutions that can provide the link between the 
talent, ambition and connections that already exist in the broader community. Offering 
residents a realistic choice between moving to mixed-income, mixed-race communities or 
remaining in a significantly improved, socially and economically viable original 
community, is a better model of addressing the problems of concentrated poverty. 
In this chapter I lay out the nature of the concentration problem and some of its 
causes and consequences, and then I go on to describe current de-concentration programs 
and examine the major successes and disappointments of these programs. I elaborate on 
the criticisms that have already been leveled against them and add my own to the queue. 
Finally, I propose an alternative to the current focus on the de-concentration of poverty. 
 
The Concentration of Poverty 
 
Long-term poverty has been publicly recognized as a problem in the United States 
at least since the 1960s when President Lyndon Johnson initiated his War on Poverty.29 
Since that time, there have been countless federal, state, and local programs designed to 
combat both individual and systemic poverty. Despite these programs, poverty has 
persisted and the gap between those who have and those who have not has widened.30 
                                                 
29 President Lyndon B. Johnson, Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union (Jan. 8, 1964). I 
recognize that the War on Poverty, during the mid 1960s, attempted a multifaceted approach to fighting poverty and 
met with, at best, mixed success. Later in this chapter, I will attempt to distinguish my approach from the earlier 
effort. 
30 CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., US CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN 
THE UNITED STATES: 2010, at 4 (2011), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/p60-239.pdf 
("Approximately 31.6 percent of the population had at least one spell of poverty lasting 2 or more months during the 
4-year period from 2004 to 2007."). The Gini index (also known as the Gini coefficient) is a traditional measure of 
income inequality. See id. at 10. "The Gini index was 0.469 in 2010. Except for the 1.5 percent decline in the Gini 
index between 2006 and 2007, there were no other statistically significant annual changes since 1993, the earliest 
year available for comparable measures of income inequality. Since 1993, the Gini index is up 3.3 percent." Id. 
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Moreover, poverty in the United States has become increasingly concentrated.31 In 2000 
more than 6.7 million people lived in communities of concentrated poverty.32 
Several explanations have been offered for the increased concentration of the very 
poor in particular neighborhoods. A superficially benign explanation is Wilson’s claim 
that the de-segregation of housing led to the voluntary outmigration of relatively 
wealthier African-Americans from the racially (but not economically) segregated urban 
neighborhoods in which they lived to other neighborhoods, often in the suburbs.33 
Those left behind were, to a great extent, households without the financial means 
to leave. The problems caused by the exodus of working class and, middle-and upper-
income African-Americans from their communities were exacerbated by the loss of well-
paying industrial jobs in the urban centers. Thus, remaining families not only lost what 
Wilson thought was the social adhesive that kept the communities together and well 
functioning, but also the means for those who remained to obtain well-compensated 
employment.34 
Other commentators have pointed to several less benign causes. These include  
persistent racial discrimination and the lingering effects of consciously implemented 
governmental interventions in markets that were intended to segregate citizens by race 
and economic class.35 Examples of these policies include the explicit early guidelines of 
the Federal Housing Administration concerning mortgage availability for African-
Americans;36 the segregated siting of public housing developments; the Interstate 
Highway program; and the Urban Renewal program. Each of these programs pushed 
people into highly segregated neighborhoods and physically isolated those 
neighborhoods, or forced people to remain in them. Later, when it became expedient for 
governments to recapture the land or to dislocate existing communities (after government 
policies had helped to segregate the neighborhoods), government programs often 
                                                 
31 Daniel T. Lichter et al., The Geography of Exclusion: Race, Segregation, and Concentrated Poverty 2 (Nat'l 
Poverty Ctr., Working Paper No. 11–16, 2011) ("We document a 25 percent increase in the number of poor places 
during the post-2000 period (and growing shares of poor people living in them) after deep and widespread declines in 
concentrated poverty during the economic boom of the 1990s."). 
32 ALEMAYEHU BISHAW, US CENSUS BUREAU, US DEP'T OF COMMERCE, AREAS WITH CONCENTRATED POVERTY: 1999, 
at 3 tbl.1 (2005), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2005pubs/censr-16.pdf (2.8% of approximately 281 
million United States citizens – approximately 7,868,000 people – lived in census tracts with 40% or more of 
residents living in poverty at the time of the 2000 Census); Claudine Gay, Moving Out, Moving Up: Housing Mobility 
and Political Participation of the Poor 2 (Harvard University, Working Paper, 2008) (unpublished paper on file with 
the author).   
33 See WILSON, supra note 3, at 49 (“… I emphasized that inner-city neighborhoods have undergone a profound social 
transformation …. as reflected not only in their increasing rates of social dislocation (including crime, joblessness, 
out-of-wedlock births, female-headed families, and welfare dependency) but also in the changing economic class 
structure of ghetto neighborhoods. I pointed out that [previously] these neighborhoods featured a vertical integration 
of different income groups [who] all resided more or less in the same ghetto neighborhoods. I also stated that the very 
presence of working- and middle-class families enhanced the social organization of inner-city neighborhoods. 
Finally, I noted that the movement of middle-class black professionals from the inner city, (sic) followed in 
increasing numbers by working-class blacks, has left behind a much higher concentration of the most disadvantaged 
segments of the black urban population …”).  
34 Id. at 38–41. 
35 Prior to desegregation, the governmental policies affected minorities regardless of class. After desegregation, much 
of the discrimination resulted in the social and economic isolation of low-income minorities who had insufficient 
political or economic power to fight these policies and insufficient resources to escape the isolation. 
36 The practice of “redlining” was created by the Home Owners Loan Corporation and later adopted by FHA. 
Redlining draws its name from FHA’s practice of rating neighborhood quality by color scheme. The lowest quality 
neighborhoods, often reserved for those in which African-Americans resided, were coded red. See DOUGLAS S. 
MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 51 
(1993). 
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permitted or required bisecting or bulldozing these communities in the name of further 
societal progress. A few examples should suffice to demonstrate governmental 
complicity in the concentration of poverty. 
Beginning in the 1930s, through the Home Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC) and 
the FHA, the federal government deliberately steered funds away from African-American 
neighborhoods and from African-American applicants for mortgages even if they were 
financially qualified for the loan.37 This practice, which continued for several decades 
after the creation of these agencies, contributed to highly segregated neighborhoods and a 
low rate of urban homeownership among African-Americans.38 
In addition to the restrictions placed on the ability of minorities, particularly 
African-Americans, to purchase homes or even to live in integrated communities, federal 
and local policies concerning public housing placements and occupancy added to the 
segregation and isolation of minorities, and to the concentration of poverty. 
The result, if not the intent, of the public housing program of the United States was 
to segregate the races, to concentrate the disadvantaged in inner cities, and to reinforce 
the image of suburbia as a place of refuge for the problems of race, crime, and poverty.39 
The Gautreaux litigation led to a change in these policies. The District Court 
found, in Gautreaux v Chicago Housing Authority, 40 that CHA had selected sites for 
public housing and had assigned tenants to those sites on the basis of race:41 the parties 
then entered into a consent decree by which lotteries were established for current 
African-American residents of (or those on the waiting list for) public housing in 
Chicago. The winners of the lotteries obtained §8 vouchers and housing counseling to 
assist them in obtaining housing in predominantly white neighborhoods in the Chicago 
metropolitan area. At its conclusion, approximately 7,100 families were relocated under 
the program.42 
Two other, non-housing federal programs also had significant influence in 
disrupting or isolating minority communities. Starting in the late 1940s and the early 
1950s, the Urban Renewal program43 and the Interstate Highway program44 each wrought 
havoc on existing communities, almost always low-income minority communities. 
                                                 
37 For an interesting history of these federal programs, see JACKSON, supra note 11, at 195–218. 
38 “A government offering such bounty to builders and lenders could have required compliance with a 
nondiscrimination policy … Instead, FHA adopted a racial policy that could well have been culled from the 
Nuremberg laws. From its inception FHA set itself up as the protector of the all-white neighborhood. It sent its agents 
into the field to keep Negroes and other minorities from buying houses in white neighborhoods.” CHARLES ABRAMS, 
FORBIDDEN NEIGHBORS 214 (1955). 
39 JACKSON, supra note 11, at 219. 
40 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill. 1969). 
41“Uncontradicted evidence submitted to the District Court established that the public housing system operated by 
CHA was racially segregated, with four overwhelmingly white projects located in white neighborhoods and with 99 
1/2% of the remaining family units located in Negro neighborhoods and 99% of those units occupied by Negro 
tenants.” Id. at 910. 
42 James E. Rosenbaum et al., Can the Kerner Commission’s Housing Strategy Improve Employment, Education and 
Social Integration for Low-Income Blacks, in RACE, POVERTY, AND AMERICAN CITIES 275 (John Charles Boger & 
Judith Welch Wegner eds, 1996); ALEX F. SCHWARTZ, HOUSING POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES: AN INTRODUCTION 
167 (2006). 
43 Michelle Wilde Anderson, Mapped Out of Local Democracy, 62 STAN. L. REV. 931, 942 (2010) ("[I]n the past, 
such movement of individuals through displacement (such as urban renewal programs) has shown only sporadic 
success at advancing race and class integration, and it has meant land loss for minority families and the demolition of 
stable, historically rooted communities."). "As previously noted, urban renewal and redevelopment programs have a 
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Urban Renewal (which was known as Urban Redevelopment prior to the passage 
of the Housing Act of 1954) was intended to redevelop areas that had been designated as 
slums. Local governments, with significant assistance from the federal government, 
acquired land subject to the slum designation and made it available to private developers 
for redevelopment. There have been many criticisms of the program, both as to its goals 
and its effects. For example, Peter Marcuse has claimed that the supporters of Title I of 
the Housing Act of 1949 (the Title that created the urban redevelopment program) were 
not concerned with rehousing slum dwellers, but with tearing down slums – at least those 
casting a blighting influence on major business areas.45 
 
The result was the displacement of entire communities without provision for the 
return of former residents. Moreover, urban renewal eventually was used for more than 
slum clearance as many neighborhoods that were not slums were also bulldozed.46 
Despite the destruction of whole neighborhoods in which many residents had low or very 
low incomes, little or no new replacement housing was built to accommodate those 
displaced. Thus, large numbers of low-income displacees moved to other neighborhoods 
with existing low-cost housing, creating or exacerbating high-concentration poverty 
neighborhoods. 
 
The Federal Highway Act was passed in 1956 and had similarly doleful 
consequences on low-income minority communities. First, because land in and around 
poor communities was often cheaper and because political opposition there was likely to 
be less intense, the government often exercised its eminent domain rights to take such 
land for its right of way, thus disrupting the lower-income communities by displacing 
many of its residents.47 Second, the communities that remained were often isolated by the 
new highways that cut them off from other urban amenities. 48 Such communities 
became, almost literally, “the other side of the tracks.” 
 
Ironically, many of the current government programs designed to de-concentrate 
poverty are actually seeking to undo the effects of prior government policies that led to, 
or at least assisted in, the concentration in the first place. Perhaps this policy shift resulted 
from a good faith reconsideration of earlier judgments, a natural evolution of societal and 
governmental social vision. As already noted, Wilson’s work called attention to 
significant negative externalities that he claimed were associated with the concentration 
of poverty: it is also possible, though, that the second thoughts about concentrated 
poverty reflect no more than the current response to changing preferences of the white 
middle class whose members want to return to reinvigorated cities. Moreover, there was 
                                                                                                                                               
dark and extensive history of displacing low-income minority communities in order to make way for land uses that 
benefit political majorities." Id. at 949 n.57. 
44 Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84–627, 70 Stat. 374 (1956). 
45 Peter Marcuse, Housing Policy and the Myth of the Benevolent State, in CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON HOUSING 255 
(Rachel B. Bratt et al., eds, 1986).  
46 The Supreme Court approved such actions in Berman v. Parker, 348 US 26 (1954). 
47 Cf. Jon Hanson & Kathleen Hanson, The Blame Frame: Justifying (Racial) Injustice in America, 41 HARV. C.R.–
C.L. L. REV. 413, 449 (2006) ("The Federal Highway Act funded a highway system to link cities to growing suburbs, 
permanently destroying much predominantly minority, low-income housing to build roads on which poor, car-less 
minorities rarely drove. Such targeted infrastructure development also led to depreciation or significantly lower 
appreciation in black areas than in white areas, further concentrating wealth among the population already controlling 
the most assets.") (citations omitted). 
48 See Oliver A. Pollard, III, Smart Growth: The Promise, Politics, and Potential Pitfalls of Emerging Growth 
Management Strategies, 19 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 247, 260 (2000) ("Planners of the Federal Highway Act of 1956 declared 
that the effect of the massive highway building program would be 'to disperse our factories, our stores, our people; in 
short, to create a revolution in living habits.' This is precisely what has occurred." (quoting William H. Whyte Jr, 
Urban Sprawl, in THE EXPLODING METROPOLIS 133, 144 (1957))). 
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pressure on government by developers who wished to cater to the desires of the 
prospective middle class occupants by developing what they considered to be underused 
urban land. 
The Movement to De-concentrate Poverty 
As the concentration of poverty accelerated,49 Wilson’s work called attention to what he 
claimed were the significant negative externalities associated with it.50 Congress, as well 
as many state and local legislatures, accepted the idea that concentrations of poverty 
created these externalities and that they, in turn, led to social and financial costs to local 
jurisdictions and to many individuals and families. Legislative bodies began to consider 
ways to reduce the concentration of poverty and thus to reduce the public costs associated 
with the perceived pathologies. 
 
Two distinct approaches have been utilized by governments in attempting to 
alleviate the concentrations of poverty. The first involves dispersing the poor from dense, 
high-concentration neighborhoods to other, less poor, areas. This approach is exemplified 
by federal programs such as Gautreaux and Moving to Opportunity. On a local level, 
many jurisdictions have adopted Inclusionary Zoning programs,51 and programs modeled 
on MTO. San Diego, for example, has implemented a local program known as Choice 
Communities52 to assist low-income residents to move from high-concentration 
neighborhoods to higher-income communities. 
 
The other approach adopted by many jurisdictions is to bring wealthier residents 
into previously high-concentration communities. HOPE VI represents the federal effort in 
this regard, while local programs such as the District of Columbia’s New Communities 
Program53 attempt to replicate HOPE VI on a local level. Some critics attack these 
programs as spurring the market phenomenon of gentrification, the purchasing of 
property in formerly low-income areas by affluent buyers desirous of urban living 
environments. Often, but not always, the affluent buyers are of a different race than the 
lower-income original residents.54 
 
In implementing these programs, governments adopted the theory that by de-
concentrating the poor, the negative externalities associated with concentration would be 
reduced. Residents who were able to reside in mixed-income communities, a stated goal 
                                                 
49 The growth of concentrated poverty has been explosive. Edward G. Goetz, citing studies by Danziger and 
Gottschalk and Jargowsky, both of which used a 40% threshold for concentration, has pointed out that between 1970 
and 1990, the number of high poverty neighborhoods more than doubled and the number of people living in these 
neighborhoods grew from 4.1 million to 8 million. EDWARD G. GOETZ, CLEARING THE WAY: DECONCENTRATING THE 
POOR IN URBAN AMERICA 25 (2003). 
50 WILSON, supra note 3, at 21–22. 
51 See Nicholas Benson, Note, A Tale of Two Cities: Examining the Success of Inclusionary Zoning Ordinances in 
Montgomery County, Maryland and Boulder, Colorado, 13 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 753 (2010) ("First enacted in 
communities on the East and West Coasts more than forty years ago, inclusionary zoning is now implemented in 250 
local communities across the United States. In total, these inclusionary programs have generated an estimated eighty 
to ninety thousand affordable housing units since their inception.") (citation omitted). 
52 San Diego Housing Commission Choice Communities, http://sdhc.org/Rental-Assistance/Rental-Assistance-
Participants/Request-to-Move/Choice-Communities/ (last visited Sept. 23, 2011). 
53 Office of the Deputy Mayor for Planning and Economic Development, New Communities, THE DISTRICT OF 
COLUMBIA, http://dmped.dc.gov/DC/DMPED/Projects/New+Communities (last visited Sept. 23, 2011). 
54 Some have argued that gentrification is beneficial to the lower-income residents who are able to remain in 
gentrified communities. See, e.g., J. Peter Byrne, Two Cheers for Gentrification, 46 HOW. L.J. 405 (2003). Others, 
including the author, believe that the poor who remain will face severe economic and social hardship that will lead to 
their eventually leaving the neighborhood. In either event, the critics claim that the original community has been 
destroyed and the remaining residents become outsiders in the new social organization of the neighborhood. 
10 
 
of the de-concentration effort,55 could be expected to obtain the benefits that Wilson 
thought existed in black communities prior to de-segregation; role modeling, social 
control and social networking leading to economic improvement for the poor.56 
 
Professor Mark Joseph, a critic of the programs designed to implement mixed-
income communities, has restated Wilson’s cataloging of the supposed benefits of such 
programs. Their goals, he says, are: 
• the creation of social interaction and social networks between the higher and 
lower income residents that could lead to better employment opportunities; 
• the establishment of social control; 
• role modeling; and 
• creating better access to goods and services due to the social and human capital 
of the higher-income residents.57 
Many of these supposed benefits, Joseph observes, attempt to rectify defects that the 
policy-makers supposed existed in the low-income residents themselves, a reworking of 
the conventional bromide about the “undeserving” poor. They do not respond to defects 
in the social or economic structures of society that caused (or at least contributed to) the 
economic problems of many low-income people.58 This is only one of several critiques of 
the de-concentration policies that have been adopted. Other critics doubt the sincerity of 
the stated program goals59 and still others decry the destruction of community, regardless 
of the motivations for doing so.60 Moreover, commentators, both critics and supporters 
alike, point out that many of the stated goals of the programs have not been met and some 
of these commentators think they cannot be met.61 In the sections that follow, I will 
address these criticisms, beginning with evidence of the failure of the programs to 
achieve many of their stated goals. 
Outcomes of the De-concentration Programs 
In this section, I examine studies analyzing only the various federal programs. This 
is due, in part, to the relatively recent advent of many of the local programs (with the 
exception of Inclusionary Zoning which originated more than 30 years ago) and the 
relative paucity of data on the newer local initiatives. It is also important to keep in mind 
here the variety of goals that have been attributed to these programs. They run from the 
redevelopment of blighted communities to the reduction in the concentration of poverty 
so as to improve the quality of life and economic opportunities for lower-income 
residents to the reduction of the social costs of the concentration of poverty. There has 
been a good deal of success on the redevelopment front, but not as much on the improved 
opportunities for the poor, or in the reduction of social costs to society. 
 
                                                 
55 It should be noted that some critics have suggested that the goal of HOPE VI was not offering the original residents 
the opportunity to reside in mixed-income communities but rather to redevelop the public housing site into a mixed 
income community. See, e.g., Susan Clampett-Lundquist, Moving Over or Moving Up? Short-Term Gains and 
Losses for Relocated HOPE VI Families, 7 CITYSCAPE 57, 58 (2004). 
56 See WILSON, supra note 3, at 30. 
57 Mark Joseph, Early Resident Experiences at a New Mixed-Income Development in Chicago, 30 J. URB. AFF. 229, 
233 (2008). 
58 Id. Joseph goes on to observe that mixed-income development does not address the underlying causes of persistent 
poverty.  
59 Imbroscio, supra note 23 at 112 (in the context of discussing relocation in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina). 
60 See Steinberg, supra note 23; Imbroscio, supra note 23. 
61 See Goetz, supra note 17, at 6 (residents who are displaced by HOPE VI typically move to better neighborhoods 
but improvement in the quality of their lives “…. is mixed, being quite modest in most cases and frequently non 
existent.”). 
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The most visible measure of success has been purely physical. It has involved the 
demolition of highly distressed and very dense public housing developments and the 
replacement of these projects with new, lower-density developments with a substantial 
number of new units going to market rate buyers and renters. Many critics have pointed 
to the governmental emphasis on redeveloping toxic sites rather than on rehousing the 
poor in mixed-income developments.62 One frequent writer about HOPE VI, Susan 
Popkin, has noted that even the research on the program done by HUD focuses primarily 
on neighborhood benefits, not on those displaced by the programs.63 
For the displacees, the benefits are less clear. Many move to better housing and to 
neighborhoods with less overall poverty and crime64 although even these benefits are 
subject to qualification and come with significant costs. Other benefits, such as more 
social capital leading to more and better employment and wages, social integration, and 
better health and educational outcomes are not supported by the evidence.65 In fact, there 
is some evidence suggesting the overall condition of displacees may have worsened. The 
remainder of this section will be devoted to these findings. 
Levels of Poverty De-concentration and Racial Integration 
I begin this discussion with what should be an alarming reality. A huge percentage 
of the residents of public housing projects subject to the HOPE VI program are African-
American or Latino, as are the residents of the communities surrounding those sites. 66 
Moreover, 80 per cent of the residents on HOPE VI sites have total income below the 
poverty line.67 Reducing this overwhelming race and class segregation was one of the 
major stated goals of the de-concentration programs, but the results have been far from 
encouraging. 
 
Even if the de-concentration programs were highly successful in relocating former 
residents to mixed-income, mixed-race communities, the total number of persons 
relocated would comprise only a tiny portion of the poor who lived in communities 
segregated by race and/or class.68 But, of course, the programs are not highly successful 
in such relocation. Very few displaced residents of Public Housing end up in truly mixed-
income communities. Kingsley et al., for example, found that as of 2000, 49 per cent of 
the residents displaced from HOPE VI sites went to other public housing developments 
while 31 per cent obtained §8 vouchers and moved to private housing. Of these, many 
moved to nearby neighborhoods with income and racial demographics much like the 
neighborhoods they left. The remaining 20 per cent received other HUD assistance, no 
assistance at all, or were unaccounted for.69 
 
                                                 
62 See, e.g., Clampett-Lundquist, supra note 56, at 57. Clampett-Lundquist points out that nearly one half of those 
displaced from public housing due to HOPE VI relocate to other public housing projects. Only approximately 11% 
are slated to return to the redeveloped HOPE VI community. For those slated to return, the “temporary” relocation 
time may be four or five years. Id. at 57. Many others moved to other high-poverty neighborhoods. Id. at 66. 
63 Popkin, supra note 18, at 68. 
64 Id. at 70; see also; POPKIN,ET AL, supra note 19 at 30; Goetz, supra note 17, at 5. 
65 In fact, the studies on benefits for movers to mixed-income communities are mixed, but all find that there is little or 
no improvement in employment or income for such movers. 
66 POPKIN ET AL., supra note 19, at 8. 
67 Id. at 9. HUD targets the poorest to live in public housing and only the poorest would live there. 
68 In 2000, more than 25% of the urban poor (6,700,000 people) lived in neighborhoods with poverty rates of greater 
than 30%.  
69 G. Thomas Kingsley et al., Patterns of Section 8 Relocation in the HOPE VI Program, 25 J. URB. AFF. 427, 429 
(2003). 
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Many researchers have found that while the rate of poverty in the communities to 
which displacees moved is significantly lower than in their original communities, it is 
still quite high.70 Moreover, the communities to which displacees moved remained highly 
segregated by race.71  Nevertheless, many commentators have lauded the reduction of 
poverty rates from more than 60 per cent on average to approximately 27 per cent.72 Few 
of these commentators, however, discuss the fact that the poverty rate on HOPE VI sites 
has been enormous. Thus, the mere destruction of the public housing site and the 
dispersal of its residents to other communities, even if near the original site, would place 
those residents in neighborhoods with much lower rates of poverty.73 
 
Two additional facts are worth noting in this regard. Many of the communities to 
which displacees moved were “fragile” and had high rates of poverty even prior to the 
influx of the former HOPE VI residents.74 This influx pushes these communities towards 
higher concentrations of poverty, albeit sometimes remaining below the recognized 
danger threshold of 30 per cent.75 In addition, the evidence suggests that many displacees 
who moved to lower-poverty neighborhoods moved back to their original neighborhood 
(or to one geographically close to it) within a few years.76 
Levels of Social Capital and the Benefits Derived from it 
Access to neighborhood resources may depend, at least in part, on the degree to 
which residents have or can form social networks within resource-rich neighborhoods.77 
 
One of the major assumptions underlying Wilson’s theory about the effects of 
concentrated poverty was that the very poor needed higher-income people in their 
neighborhoods to act as role models, to assert a degree of social control, and to provide a 
level of social capital that would translate into better employment and income 
opportunities for them. Even if one accepted Wilson’s underlying assumption, there are 
two significant problems with the de-concentration initiatives that emanated from his 
theory. First, the mixed-income communities Wilson described prior to desegregation 
were organic. While they were created as a result of a pernicious social policy, they were 
of longstanding duration and were characterized by limited entrance or exit by residents. 
People had important commonalities, both demographic and experiential, that bound 
them together. The communities created by de-concentration programs were artificially 
                                                 
70 For example, Kingsley et al., found that the average poverty rate in census tracts containing public housing 
developments was 38% while the rate in tracts with HUD assisted housing averaged 22% and those containing §8 
voucher holders averaged 19%. The poverty rate in census tracts with HOPE VI designated public housing averaged 
61%. The tracts to which displacees of these projects moved averaged 27%. Id. at 433. 
71 POPKIN ET AL., supra note 19, at 29; Popkin, supra note 18, at 69. See also Kingsley et al., supra note 70, at 428, 
where the authors point out that, while these problems do not characterize the program as a whole, in many cities 
displacees wind up in seriously distressed, high-poverty neighborhoods not far from their original site. 
72 Kingsley, supra note 70, at 433. 
73 Rachel Dwyer, The Limits of the Deconcentration of Poverty: The Spatial Context of the Poor 11 CITY & 
COMMUNITY (2012). 
74 Popkin, supra note 18, at 83. 
75 Id. at 13 (“As people leave a poor neighborhood it gets less poor while some other neighborhood gets more poor”); 
see also Goetz, supra note17, at 15; Popkin, supra note 18 at 69 (stating that people who move from HOPE VI sites 
still face extremely poor and segregated communities); Clampett-Lundquist supra note 54 at 58 (stating that nearly 
50% of displacees moved to other public housing projects); but compare Kingsley supra note 70, at 428, who states 
that while one might expect many former residents to cluster in “a small number of less poor, but still fragile, 
neighborhoods” which then become destabilized, this did not characterize the HOPE VI program overall. 
76 Boyd et al., supra note 16, at 122. 
77 Id. at 124. 
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constructed, often with unwilling participants on each side.78 The second problem, which 
derives from the first, is that in these communities, there is very little meaningful social 
interaction taking place among the higher-and lower-income residents. 79 Moreover, there 
is little evidence that living in these communities improves the life chances for the poor.80 
 
These findings should not be entirely unexpected. The concept of community 
generally requires some element of commonality among the theoretical members.81 What, 
one might ask, other than geography would qualify as a common bond among the HOPE 
VI displacees and higher-income residents of an existing community to which they 
moved? This lack of commonality is exacerbated when one considers that, for the most 
part, the move by the displaced HOPE VI residents was involuntary82 and the reception of 
them by the members of the receiving community was rarely welcoming.83 
 
The absence of social capital contributed to disappointing results for other 
important goals of de-concentration such as increased employment and earnings 
opportunities. A much more subtle negative effect was the loss of social capital that had 
existed in the displacees’ original communities. While a more detailed discussion of both 
of these issues will be presented later in this chapter, a comment from one of the 
displaced public housing residents aptly describes the feelings of many displacees: 
 
I mean, I understand what they were trying to do. I do understand what they 
were trying to do and they were trying to give people better opportunities, but 
to force people away, to force people away from their family, their support 
system. You know, just common things that people need to have. It’s not 
beneficial.84 
 
This absence of social capital was a major factor in limiting new low-income 
residents in mixed-income communities from achieving some of the other goals of the 
de-concentration initiatives. For example, the data regarding the success of the low-
income movers to mixed-income communities in finding better employment or increasing 
income is bleak. This is true both for the adult movers and for their children after they 
became adults.85 In fact, participants in mobility programs may actually do worse than 
non-participants in being able to use contacts to find employment.86 This is the result not 
only of the lack of social contact between the economic classes: it is also due to the fact 
that many of the displacees have lower educational attainment, fewer employment skills 
and less work experience than their higher-income neighbors. Therefore, the jobs for 
which they would be qualified are limited and are less likely to be the type that the 
higher-income neighbors would be aware of.87 
 
There are other obstacles to employment for displacees. Assuming, as is often the 
case, the lower-income residents do not own cars, transportation to places of employment 
                                                 
78 Imbroscio, supra note 23 at 117;  
79 POPKIN ET AL., supra note 19, at 23; Clampett-Lundquist, supra note 56, at 69. 
80 Popkin, supra note 18, at 70. 
81 Mark L. Joseph et al., The Theoretical Basis for Addressing Poverty Through Mixed Income Development, 42 URB. 
AFF. REV. 369, 383 (2007). 
82 Popkin, supra note 18, at 71. 
83 Boyd et al., supra note 16, at 124 (stating that while blacks tend to want integrated neighborhoods, whites do not). 
84 Id. at 135 (quoting Nikki, a resident displaced by the Gautreaux Two program). 
85 Id. at 122 (concerning Gautreaux Two relocation). 
86 Boyd et al., supra note 16, at 125. 
87 Id. at 125; POPKIN ET AL., supra note 19, at 23; Clampett-Lundquist, supra note 56, at 71 (“[N]one [of the low-
income residents surveyed] reported having learned of a job opportunity from a new neighbor but several had while 
in public housing.”); see also Joseph, supra note 58, at 234. 
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may be difficult.88 The availability of child care may determine whether a resident can 
take an available job.89 Moreover, there are a series of health-related barriers, including 
asthma, diabetes, and obesity that prevent many displacees from obtaining employment.90 
These barriers are independent of the existence of systemic discrimination, which also 
remains an obstacle for minorities in actually obtaining available jobs for which they are 
qualified.91 
Costs to Displacees 
There are other, non-employment-based problems associated with the move to 
mixed-income communities. While there is evidence that displacees who moved to 
mixed-income communities lived in better housing and safer neighborhoods,92 there is 
also evidence that the move imposed significant costs on them. These include both direct 
and indirect financial costs. The indirect costs include the loss of social networks and the 
benefits these networks provided, such as material goods, child care, and informal social 
control.93 
 
In addition to the emotional and indirect financial costs of moving away from 
social networks, there were direct financial costs as well. These included higher costs for 
needs such as transportation and child care which often made it difficult for many movers 
to afford food and other necessities. Perhaps more surprisingly, housing costs increased 
for many people who moved to the private market. The increase was due primarily to 
utility costs, which were previously covered in their public housing rents, but were no 
longer covered by the §8 voucher provided to displacees.94 
 
The psychological costs were also high. Aside from the obvious sense of distance 
from friends, movers felt a sense of stigma and alienation in their new communities.95 
Displacees often felt as if they were being monitored by a disapproving community. They 
also reported a sense of relative deprivation in comparison to their higher-income 
neighbors.96 One commentator has pointed to the “de-mobilizing” effect of being poor 
and living in a community of plenty97 which results in the lower-status individuals 
experiencing feelings of alienation.98 One other area of cost should also be mentioned 
although it is more ephemeral than some of the others. This is the loss of influence 
concerning neighborhood issues suffered by those who moved to mixed-income 
communities. The loss is the result of several factors: the newness of the movers to the 
community and the associated lack of social capital that has already been mentioned; the 
relatively greater sophistication of the preexisting residents; and the greater financial and 
political resources of those residents. This loss is partially offset by the relatively greater 
level of goods and services in the community, many of which one could hypothesize 
substantially all residents would desire. Nevertheless, these goods and services typically 
                                                 
88 Boyd et al., supra note 16, at 136; see also Goetz, supra note 17, at 9. 
89 Goetz, supra note 17, at 9. 
90 Alastair Smith, Joint Ctr. for Hous. Stud. of Harv. Univ., Mixed-Income Housing Developments: Promises and 
Reality 26 (2002), available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/W02-10_Smith.pdf. 
91 See Joseph et al., supra note 82, at 399. 
92 Popkin, supra note 18, at 70. 
93 Clampett-Lundquist, supra note 56, at 69. 
94 Popkin, supra note 18, at 83.  
95 Gray, supra note 33 at 16; Mark L. Joseph, Is Mixed-Income Development an Antidote to Urban Poverty, 17 
HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 209, 217 (2006). 
96 Robert J. Chaskin & Mark L. Joseph, Building “Community” in Mixed Income Developments: Assumptions, 
Approaches, and Early Experiences, 45 URB. AFF. REV. 299, 303 (2010). 
97 Gay, supra note 33, at 10. 
98 Id. at 16. 
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cater to the wishes of the higher-income residents and, in any case, are often obtained 
without input from or, in many cases, consideration of the needs of the new, lower-
income residents.99 
 
Critiques of the De-concentration Programs and Strategy 
 
In this section, I discuss the practical and theoretical criticisms that have been (or 
could be) leveled against the de-concentration concept and programs. Among the most 
basic complaints is that, even if the programs were highly successful in achieving their 
stated goals, their scale is so small in comparison to the need that they make minimal 
impact into the racial and economic segregation of the poor. But, of course, the programs, 
as I demonstrated in the previous section, have not met many of their stated goals. In 
addition, the implementation of the programs has imposed substantial costs both on the 
displacees and on those who remain in concentrated low-income neighborhoods. 
 
Study after study has shown that there has been little neighboring between the 
higher-and lower-income residents of a mixed-income neighborhood.100 There has been 
little social capital developed and little or no improvement in employment status, hours 
worked or overall income.101 Mental health outcomes for the low-income residents were 
mixed. While many movers reported a greater sense of well-being in their new 
community, others reported a sense of alienation, stigma and relative deprivation.102 
Research has not shown that the provision of “basic” resident services in mixed-income 
communities has led to improved obesity and mental health outcomes for displacees.103 
Similarly, several studies show no positive educational outcomes for the children of 
movers.104 Many, in fact, did not change schools, but continued attending their original 
school.105 For those who did change schools, there has been little interaction between the 
new students and their higher-income classmates.106 Even where such interaction existed, 
the low-income students did not consider their classmates as role models and they had 
little or no interaction with the parents of their new classmates.107 Conversely, many 
lower-income students also reported feelings of racism, stigma, and isolation.108 
 
The failures of these programs to achieve their goals in reference to those who 
moved to mixed-income neighborhoods is all the more striking because these who moved 
into the mixed-income settings were selected only after a rigorous screening process 
designed to identify the most stable and upwardly mobile public housing residents. Hard-
to-house families, on the other hand, were offered very little as they were shunted to 
other public housing projects or allowed to move with their §8 voucher to other high-
                                                 
99 Joseph, supra note 96 at 216.  
100 POPKIN ET AL., supra note 19, at 23; Clampett-Lundquist, supra note 56, at 69; Smith, supra note 91, at 2; Joseph, 
supra note 96, at 217. 
101 Joseph, supra note 96, at 217; POPKIN ET AL., supra note 19, at 23; Goetz, supra note 17, at 9. 
102 Gray, supra note 33, at 16. 
103 Marjorie Austin Turner, et al., Estimating the Public Costs and Benefits of HOPE VI Investments: Methodological 
Report, at 35 (2007) (“Existing research provides no evidence that a mixed-income redevelopment scenario with 
‘basic’ resident services would lead to improvement in resident obesity or mental health problems. However, 
‘enhanced’ services could reasonably be expected to yield significant improvement in resident health.”) Urban 
Insititue, available at http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=411497.  
104 Goetz, supra note 17 at 8. 
105 Clampett-Lundquist, supra note 56, at 71. Goetz supra note 17, at 8. 
106 Id. at 71.  
107 Goetz, supra note 17 at 11. 
108 Gray, supra note 33, at 16. 
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poverty neighborhoods geographically and demographically close to their original 
communities.109 
 
In order to be eligible to move into a mixed-income community, public housing 
residents had to: 
• be in compliance with their existing lease; 
• be working at least 30 hours per week; 
• have no unpaid utility bills; 
• have no criminal record; and 
• pass a drug test.110 
 
The fact that those who moved to mixed-income neighborhoods did not achieve the 
success that was predicted for them raises the question that many have asked: can 
proximity alone influence social relations?111 The answer seems to be no. The creation of 
community, the creation of relationships that encourage interaction with and concern for 
others requires significant commonalities among the members.112 These commonalities 
are not immediately apparent when low-income people of color move into communities 
of middle-and upper-income white residents. Thus, the expectation of employment 
opportunities and social support emanating from the higher-income residents for the 
benefit of the new, lower-income residents appears to be unrealistic. 
 
These implementation failures are not, however, the main problems associated 
with the de-concentration strategy. The main problems are conceptual. There are three 
major theoretical difficulties associated with the de-concentration strategy. First, it breaks 
up existing communities on the supposition that they are valueless or, worse, toxic, and 
cannot be made to function adequately. The break-up is undertaken without consultation 
with the residents of those communities and in disregard of the wishes of many of them. 
Second, it is based on the premise that, somehow, economic integration will compensate 
for structural flaws in the economic and social systems. It ignores systematically imposed 
educational and skills deficits brought on by past discrimination and turns a blind eye to 
current prejudice. Third, it caters heavily to the needs of business interests and middle-
income, predominantly white, homebuyers. In this way, it is reminiscent of the racially 
based displacement of poor people that occurred under the Urban Renewal and Highway 
programs, programs that regularly served the interests of people other than those 
displaced. 
The Break-up of Existing Communities 
A widespread view of low-income communities, particularly those of color, is that 
they are dysfunctional. This is even more pronounced when the community is in a public 
housing development. This view is the theoretical basis for the de-concentration strategy. 
However, low-income communities generally function well, albeit without the various 
accoutrements of wealth. Most adults work, interact in traditional ways, rely on their 
friends and neighbors, and obey the law. In fact, William Ryan et al. found “… contrary 
                                                 
109 Goetz, supra note 17, at 7. 
110 Joseph, supra note 58, at 236; Smith, supra note 91, at 23. 
111 Joseph et al., supra note 82, at 381–82. 
112 Smith goes so far as to say homogeneity is necessary for a high level of interaction. Smith, supra note 91, at 26. 
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to conventional wisdom, people at different income levels display pretty much the same 
distribution of values, social attitudes and lifestyles.”113 
 
What, then, accounts for the alacrity with which we seek to disrupt existing 
communities? One answer might be the replacement of a decaying physical 
infrastructure. If that is all that is being sought, however, it could be done without the 
destruction of otherwise serviceable housing or, it could be done with allowing all who 
want to return to the redeveloped community to do so. If what is sought is improvement 
of the quality of life for residents of the disrupted community, again, the method chosen 
seems unsuited to the task. For those who move to mixed-income communities, they do 
gain better housing and better physical infrastructure. They do not gain much social 
capital and, in fact, may lose much of the benefit provided by social capital in the old 
communities. A more pressing question is what happens to those who do not move to 
mixed-income communities? 
 
The evidence is clear that those chosen to move to mixed-income neighborhoods 
are (in conventional terms) the highest achievers among the local residents. Thus, the 
problems first suggested by William Julius Wilson, that is, the drain of talent and 
resource from minority communities due to desegregation, is repeated by the “creaming” 
of the public housing residents. Those who move to other public housing projects or into 
private housing in “fragile” nearby communities are left to fend for themselves without 
counseling or social services associated with the move. Given the de-concentration 
theory, this would be likely to exacerbate the problems of those displaced to other low-
income communities and of the communities to which they move. 
 
But it is also clear that, despite their obvious problems, low-income communities 
also have strengths. They certainly contain networks of personal connections that make 
many residents reluctant to leave them.114 In addition, there are often well-functioning 
institutions, both public and private, that address many of the needs of local residents. 
While there may not be a sufficient number of these institutions and those that exist may 
not have sufficient resources to meet all of the needs of those who live there, 
nevertheless, they do provide a basis for a different way of thinking about concentrated 
poverty. 
 
Concerning social services, there is an efficiency associated with providing these 
services, which essentially everyone agrees is a necessary ingredient in the battle against 
poverty, in a confined geographic area. It is certainly more difficult and more costly to 
provide such services across a wide geographic area and with widely dispersed 
recipients.115 Again, this is not to say that society should restrict the poor to certain 
neighborhoods. It is to suggest that such neighborhoods exist and that they offer 
numerous benefits to the residents. Instead of destroying them, governmental policy 
could focus on making them stronger and more beneficial to those who live in them and 
to those who might want to. 
De-concentration and Structural Flaws 
                                                 
113 Quoted in Joseph et al., supra note 82, at 392. Ryan, however, goes onto note the difference between values and 
actions. 
114 In fact, Goetz found that in a Seattle Hope VI project, 60% of those displaced thought that their old neighborhood 
was a better place to live than their new one. Goetz, supra note 17, at 11. 
115 Smith, supra note 91, at 25. 
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American society has been plagued by the problem of persistent, systemic poverty. 
For centuries and across cultures, however, society has viewed this problem as being 
primarily attributable to the poor, themselves. Distinctions between poverty and 
pauperism, between the “deserving” and the “undeserving” poor, have dominated policy 
as well as common discourse. For centuries in England and the United States, distinctions 
were made between those who suffered poverty due to conditions beyond their control 
such as advanced age, infancy, disability, or sickness and all others who were said to be 
lazy, unambitious, drunkards or criminals.116 The latter group was labeled as paupers or 
the undeserving poor and was largely cut off from assistance. The former group, labeled 
the deserving poor, obtained various forms of assistance from their communities, from 
charities, or from the state.117 These characterizations were often highly correlated with 
race, but the symbiosis between race and poverty was rarely examined. 
 
Even recently, there have been labels of the poor that suggest the blame for poverty 
lies with the poor, themselves. Terms such as the “culture of poverty” and the 
“underclass” have been used in the past several decades to describe certain groups of 
poor people. The culture of poverty was first brought to public consciousness by Oscar 
Lewis. He used the term to describe several “traits” that he ascribed to the poor. The 
culture, he said: 
 
… tends to perpetuate itself from generation to generation because of its effects 
on the children. By the time the slum children are six or seven, they have 
usually absorbed the basic values … and are not psychologically geared to take 
full advantage of … increased opportunities that may occur in their 
lifetimes.118 
 
Michael B. Katz pointed out that the culture of poverty concept was not intended to 
classify the poor. He claims, however, that it did just that. Most commentators, according 
to Katz, recognized that the “culture of poverty” did not apply to all poor people. Rather, 
it placed in a class by themselves those whose behaviors and values converted their 
poverty into an enclosed and self-perpetuating world of dependence. Although some of 
its exponents located the sources of poverty in objective factors such as unemployment, 
the new concept resonated with traditional moral definitions.119 
 
Similarly, the term “the underclass,” which started as an academic concept, was 
transformed into a popular and pejorative label for urban African-Americans. Beginning 
with Gunnar Myrdal’s use of the term underclass “to describe the victims of 
deindustrialization,”120 the term went through a series of definitions until the 29 August 
1977 issue of Time Magazine did a cover story entitled, “The American Underclass: 
Destitute and Desperate in the Land of Plenty.”121 The article went on to describe, in 
particularly negative terms, the personal attributes of poor, urban African-Americans. 
The term as a pejorative label had entered the popular consciousness. 
 
                                                 
116 For an interesting historical view of distinguishing and labeling the poor, see HERBERT J. GANS, THE WAR AGAINST 
THE POOR: THE UNDERCLASS AND ANTIPOVERTY POLICY 11–26 (1995). 
117 Labels such as these certainly continued into the latter part of the twentieth century and were used by mainstream 
media, individuals, and institutions. Ronald Reagan used the term “welfare queen” in his 1976 presidential campaign. 
See “Welfare Queen” Becomes Issue in Reagan Campaign, NY TIMES, Feb. 15, 1976, at 51.  
118 GANS, supra note 117, at 24 (quoting Oscar Lewis, The Culture of Poverty, in ON UNDERSTANDING POVERTY 188 
(Daniel P. Moynihan ed., 1968)). 
119 MICHAEL B. KATZ, THE UNDESERVING POOR 16 (1989). 
120 GANS, supra note 117, at 27. 
121 Id. at 32. 
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The HOPE VI program and many other de-concentration programs have at their 
core, albeit often tacitly, a similar belief in the moral and intellectual incapacity of many 
of the poor, particularly poor people of color.122 Among the central claims for these 
programs is the social control and role-modeling that will result when the poor are living 
with higher-income neighbors. Recall William Julius Wilson’s lament that desegregation 
resulted in the removal of the social adhesive that had allowed African-American 
communities to function and that gave young people role models and hope for the 
future.123 The structural flaws in the society are not addressed by the de-concentration 
strategies. The question might be asked as to how mixed-income communities will end 
racial discrimination? How will they create millions of jobs that offer a living wage? 
How will they offer better basic and vocational education to poor young people? As Mark 
Joseph has said: 
 
… it is unlikely that mixed-income residence by itself can promote 
observable change in the short or medium term. In terms of 
employment, the roles of macrostructural factors-the strength of the 
economy, the availability of accessible jobs for which residents are 
qualified and for which they will be fairly considered-cannot be 
influenced by simply relocating to a mixed-income development.124 
 
The Cynical View of Community Redevelopment 
 
The final theoretical critique of de-concentration programs that I will discuss is 
that they often serve the interests of people other than the low-income residents who are 
subject to their disruptions. There are several interest groups who stand to benefit by the 
redevelopment of formerly low-income inner-city neighborhoods. These include local 
governments looking for greater tax income from development and from the higher-
income residents who will occupy these redeveloped spaces. A second constituency is 
higher-income buyers who are looking for safe and convenient urban living experiences. 
Third are the real estate developers who are seeking valuable “underutilized” land to 
redevelop and sell. Next, there are merchants who would not have ventured into the 
former neighborhoods but might now hasten to serve the higher-spending new occupants. 
Finally, there are those who might wish to minimize the political organization and 
potential power of low-income residents. This can be accomplished by dispersing them to 
areas where they will be overshadowed in numbers, financial resources and social and 
political networking by their higher-income neighbors. It might also be accomplished 
merely by breaking up existing constituencies and networks. 
 
These concerns are reminiscent of those expressed in connection with the Urban 
Renewal program in the 1960s when the process of destruction of African-American 
communities in the name of slum removal and redevelopment came to be known, in 
James Baldwin’s term, as “Negro Removal.”125 Massey and Denton argue that Urban 
Renewal was enacted at the behest of white elites. Their goal was to stop the spread of 
African-American neighborhoods that might threaten their elite enclaves. Thus, entire 
black neighborhoods were razed and redeveloped for other uses. These areas became a 
buffer against the expanding black ghetto while at the same time forcing the former 
residents into other highly segregated neighborhoods, or into newly constructed public 
                                                 
122 Joseph, supra note 58. 
123 Wilson, supra note 3, at 38–41. 
124 Joseph et al., supra note 82, at 399. 
125 During Urban Renewal’s heyday, the 1950s and 1960s, hundreds of thousands of units of low-cost housing was 
destroyed and millions of people, mostly poor and African-American, were displaced from their homes and 
communities. There was very little assistance in relocating the displaced families and the typical rent costs for these 
families went from about $60 per month to about $195 per month. See KATZ, supra note 120, at 136. 
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housing projects that were placed in African-American neighborhoods and were, of 
course, themselves highly segregated.126 
 
The political similarities between Urban Renewal and HOPE VI are stark. In each 
case, there was a public rhetoric of offering assistance to those in need, of redeveloping 
highly distressed communities. I am sure there were many, policy-makers and citizens 
alike, who pursued these programs in the belief that what they were doing was beneficial 
to the poor. And, to be fair, in many cases there was improvement in the quality of life of 
low-income residents who moved as a result of the de-concentration programs, 
particularly in the lives of those who moved voluntarily. Most displaces, however, were 
involuntarily displaced. This meant that connections, support networks and, to use the 
encompassing term, communities, were disrupted.127 
 
It also meant that, since more housing units were destroyed than were replaced, 
displacees were largely shunted to neighborhoods with significant vacancy rates or to 
where they could double up. These tended to be other low-income neighborhoods with 
high or growing concentrations of poverty. As a consequence of the stringent eligibility 
requirements for residents to move to mixed-income communities, many of the 
involuntary displaces were hard-to-house households which often put additional strains 
on the new communities to which they moved. Already inadequate social services were 
stretched even thinner when the need was for far greater support. 
 
Finally, whatever political power and organizing opportunities existed in the 
original neighborhoods was disrupted, if not destroyed, by the displacement that resulted 
from the de-concentration programs. For the movers to mixed-income communities, the 
loss is obvious. The movers became a small minority in a new community in which they 
had few ties and in which new ones proved difficult to create. For the displacees who 
moved to other low-income communities, they entered new settings in which their old 
connections had been weakened and they needed access to existing networks that were 
likely to have preexisting hierarchies and social norms. 
Community-building Alternatives to De-concentration 
The movement to de-concentrate poverty is based upon the supposition that 
communities with very high concentrations of poverty involve insurmountable problems 
for the residents of those communities and for society. Sometimes, this is true. More 
often, it is not. Communities, and this term connotes something more than merely an 
aggregate of individuals living in a defined geographic space, suggests important 
connections among people and between people and place. They serve important personal 
and societal ends so that when destroyed, something valuable is lost. I, and many others, 
have argued that even when undertaken with the best of intentions (which is often the 
case), destruction of communities in the name of de-concentration of poverty has had this 
destructive effect. 
 
There may be situations when community destruction may serve some greater 
good, even for the people who are displaced by the destruction. Consider, for example, 
the removal of residents from an unsafe building or from a neighborhood in jeopardy due 
to life-threatening pollutants. There may even be situations when the dangers, even 
                                                 
126 DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, supra note 37, at 55–56. 
127Moreover, whatever benefits, limited thought they may have been, that were realized by voluntary movers, such 
benefits were unlikely to be produced for the involuntary displaces. Popkin, supra note 18, at 71. 
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overwhelming dangers, come from other residents, or situations where any semblance of 
social order has broken down. In cases like these, most people, even, perhaps, critics of 
de-concentration, would say that the displacement, the destruction of what remains of 
community, would be appropriate. But these cases are rare. What is more common is the 
destruction of viable communities, albeit communities with significant social and 
economic problems. 
To be clear, I am not arguing blindly for the preservation of high-concentration 
communities. I do argue that in a just society such communities would not be forced to 
exist. But they do exist, often as a result of governmental policy and therefore, in my 
view, society has obligations to them and to their residents. Residents of high-
concentration neighborhoods who want to move should be assisted, financially, 
emotionally, and practically, to do so. Those who wish to stay should be able to do so in 
safety and dignity. For this to happen, however, there needs to be a combined place-based 
and people-based strategy. Housing and the physical infrastructure must be improved. 
Existing community institutions must be identified and strengthened. New institutions 
must be created that address currently unmet needs. Individuals must be given the 
opportunity to gain skills that will help them achieve both economic improvement and 
life satisfactions. 
 
The first element of this multifaceted program is the production of an adequate 
supply of decent affordable housing. This should be accomplished in both low-income 
communities and in other communities throughout the economy. As a corollary to the 
construction or rehabilitation of affordable units, subsidies of various sorts should be 
available to low-income households that would allow them to live, to the greatest extent 
possible, where they choose. This might be accomplished through such programs as 
Housing Choice vouchers,128 the District of Columbia’s Local Rent Supplement 
program,129 and Inclusionary Zoning.130 
 
In order for these programs to work effectively, there must be active enforcement 
of federal and local fair housing laws. Too often, the “not in my backyard” syndrome or 
outright discrimination has prevented the racial and/or economic integration of 
neighborhoods. These obstacles might be overcome with a more rigorous enforcement 
policy by governments at all levels. 
 
However, the creation of additional affordable housing and housing support, while 
necessary, is not sufficient to improve the quality of neighborhoods, or to reap the 
benefits thought to be derived from the economic integration strategy. To obtain these 
benefits there must be a comprehensive program of: 
•  social services, including health, educational, youth development, and other 
services; 
• economic development, including small business development by local residents, 
the attraction of outside employers to the community, and job training and 
readiness programs; 
• financial services including financial literacy training, the creation and/or 
attraction of financial institutions such as commercial banks, credit unions and 
Community Development Financial Institutions; and 
• political organizing and education. 
 
                                                 
128 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (2006). 
129 D.C. CODE ANN. § 6–226 (2011). 
130 See supra notes 7, 52 and accompanying text. 
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Such ideas are not new. As early as the 1960s, during the Great Society and the War 
on Poverty, various programs were initiated with the idea of providing more 
comprehensive and holistic services to poor neighborhoods and families. Programs such 
as the Community Action Program131 and Model Cities132 were designed to provide 
comprehensive and coordinated community-based physical and human development 
activities. In addition, The Office of Economic Opportunity funded many Community 
Development Corporations in poor communities throughout the nation.133 These 
programs were place-based efforts to combat poverty and to improve existing 
communities. Their lack of success can be attributed to a variety of causes, including 
inadequate funding, lack of long-term commitment, and political misjudgments and 
missteps, not to mention the intransigency of the structural obstacles to success.134 
 
Since the demise of the Great Society programs, there have been a series of local, 
typically privately initiated, programs that have attempted and, to a great extent, have 
succeeded in improving local communities. These programs have been called, 
generically, Comprehensive Community Initiatives, or CCIs.135 Perhaps the most well 
known is the Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative (DSNI) near the Roxbury-Dorchester 
neighborhoods in Boston. In its more than 25 years of operation, DSNI has engaged in 
the development of decent affordable housing, the improvement of the local public 
schools, youth and parenting programs, and in organizing collaborative efforts with other 
neighborhoods. 136 
 
The goal of the CCIs is to involve residents in indentifying and prioritizing local 
problems and planning and implementing sustainable solutions to them. While funding 
for such initiatives has largely been private with some local government support, the 
diversion of some of the federal funds currently used for HOPE VI and similar 
dislocating programs could significantly enhance the number and scope of the 
community initiatives. While these initiatives are not panaceas for the problems of poor 
communities, they have been shown to have potential for more comprehensive place-
based improvements and to do so while leaving existing communities intact. 
 
Conclusion 
 
I have attempted in this chapter to provide a counterpoint to the perceived 
wisdom of a policy of involuntarily de-concentrating poverty. I have pointed out that the 
policy has failed to produce many of the benefits expected of it and has caused a good 
deal of harm to those displaced by it. I have also pointed out that even if the goals had 
been substantially met and the harms had been averted, the small scale of the policy 
leaves it far from being a solution for concentrated poverty. As Edward Goetz has 
pointed out: 
 
                                                 
131 This program called for the establishment of local Community Action Agencies that included “maximum feasible 
participation of the residents.” These CAAs were to design and coordinate development activities and service 
provision in low-income communities. Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88–452, § 202, 78 Stat. 508, 
516 (1964).  
132 Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89–754, 80 Stat. 1255 (1966). 
133  Economic Opportunity Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92–424, § 712, 86 Stat. 688 (1972). 
134 For an interesting discussion of these programs and their political history, see ROBERT HALPERN, REBUILDING THE 
INNER CITY, 106–148 (1995). 
135 For a recent listing of research work on CCIs, see Chris Walker, Bibliography: Research on Comprehensive 
Community Initiatives (2010) available at http://www.instituteccd.org/library/1402. 
136 For a history of DSNI, see PETER MEDOFF & HOLLY SKLAR, STREETS OF HOPE: THE FALL AND RISE OF AN URBAN 
NEIGHBORHOOD, (1994). 
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Mobility programs face a paradox-they must remain small to remain 
politically viable but smallness ensures they will never address 
concentrated poverty adequately.137 
 
Moreover, given the screening process by which residents are selected to move to 
less poor communities, commentators have raised considerable doubt as to whether the 
benefits that have been shown to occur do so because of the effects of a new 
neighborhood and their lower concentrations of poverty or because of the personal and 
family characteristics of those who have successfully moved.138 In fact, Alastair Smith 
points out that very little research has been done on the question of whether mixed-
income solutions are even necessary. He asks whether other strategies can achieve the 
same goals in low-income communities. 
 
What comes with mixed income is a bundle of housing attributes that allow policy-
makers to say how well it works. If you provide very-low-income people with good 
management, good maintenance and housing that blends in, mixed income may not be 
necessary.139 
 
Nevertheless, I do not intend this chapter to be a condemnation of mobility 
programs. So long as such programs are truly voluntary and are accompanied with 
appropriate support, they should be a part of the policy arsenal arrayed against poverty. In 
this chapter, however, I do argue for greater recognition of the importance and, indeed, 
the capacities of existing communities. By addressing the structural causes of poverty and 
segregation and by preserving and improving existing communities, society can provide 
real choices to lower income citizens as to where to live. 
 
 
 
                                                 
137 Edward G. Goetz, The Reality of Deconcentration (2004) available at 
http://www.nhi.org/online/issues/138/deconcentration.html. 
138 Gay, supra note 33, 5. 
139 SMITH, supra note 91 at 21, quoting Rachel Bratt. 
